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OE G O D * 
(Whom is the mask worn by?) 
P e t e r L O S O N C Z I 
Introduction: The problem of legitimacy 
J n the Third Meditation we can read the following: 
„By the name ,God' I understand a substance that is infinite (eternal, immutable,) 
independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which 1 myself and everything else, if 
anything else exist, have been created"1 
As we know it on the ground of this idea Descartes comes to the conclusion that God 
necessarily exists. 
This is one of the most problematic and criticised point of the Cartesian philosophy. 
Pascal was not the only one who couldn't forgive Descartes2-
The legitimacy of God's presence in the thought of Descartes has been called in 
question during the last four hundred years by many authors. 
We can distinguish two main groups of the critics. 
The representations of the one group state that Descartes tried to prove God's 
existence just because he needed an „epistemological Jolly Joker"(Ferenc Altrichter) or 
because he wanted deserve the support of the Church(Tom Sorell). 
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According to the other, perhaps more moderate standpoint,. Descartes's God is a 
„stillborn God"3 or he had been a quasi-atheist. 
In short we can say that for some of them it is too much what Descartes says about God, 
while for others it is not enough 
Naturally, there are several problematic moments in his works. We can point out 
logical and metaphysical tensions, incoherence, theological deficiency. But does it mean 
that we should totally reject his statements concerning God? My aim is not to defend 
Cartesian metaphysics as such. But I would like to defend him against the charge of 
untr ustworth iness. 
In my opinion, despite of the tensions of his philosophy, we can show out a 
fundamental legitimacy of God's presence in Descartes's work. 1 think that by a 
phenomenological investigation, we can point out the presence of the religious experience 
in it. I don't think that this attempt will solve all the problems that may arise in 
Descartes's metaphysics. But I hope it helps to establish the legitimacy mentioned above. 
How could we reach this purpose? 
By following Descartes in the process of his meditatio we can arrive at a non-cognitive 
element where this peculiar internal experience can be pointed out. I call this element 
religious level and I distinguish it from the philosophical-theological level of Descartes's 
thought. My investigation will focuse on the definition quoted above, more exatcly on the 
concept of infinity. In my opinion, this concept has an essential role in Descartes's 
thinking about divinity. What should be pointed out that it is not so by accident but just 
because it contains that special surplus value that the religious experience and meaning 
possesses.4 
The problem of religious experience 
What do I mean by the special surplus value just mentioned? What is that characteristic 
feature of the religious experience, which distinguishes it from other experiences? 
Naturally, we cannot give a detailed analysis of this problem here, but an outline about it. 
Joachim Wach gives four formal features of the religious experience5 
1) „Religious experience is a total response to what we experience as ultimate 
reality (...)to what we realize as... conditioning all that constitutes our world of 
experiences..." 
2) „Religious experience is a total response of the total being to what is apprehended 
as ultimate reality." 
3) „The genuine religious is the most intense experience man is capable of..." 
4) „The religious experience is practical, that is to say it involves an imperative, a 
commitment which impels man to act..." 
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It is important to emphasize that this ultimate response or motif is not an outcome of 
intellectual considerations6. Although it contains certain intellectual elements, the 
original inner experience should be concerned prior to other elements. The latter are 
based on the former ones. 
As Emmanuel Levinas7 writes, there is a peculiar state in which our mind gives up its 
exertion for intentionality. This is the modification called insomnia by Levinas. „Insomnia 
is a wakefulness, but wakefulness without intentionality, dis-interested8"This dis-
interestedness leads to the breaking up of consciousness. And this breaking up appears 
what is beyond all content — what is uncontained, infinity.9 
I think this petrifying of consciousnes to be the core of the surplus value mentioned 
above. This is the moment which forces the human being to respond the Absolute. 
But where are the traces of this surplus value to be found in the Cartesian thought? 
The concept of infinity in Descartes 's philosophy 
My task is twofold. On one hand, I have to show the priority of the concept of infinity in 
the Cartesian theology. On the other hand, I shall try to point out, that it is so because 
this concept has a reference to the religious experience. 
Descartes himself empasizes this priority in many cases. In the Second Set of the 
Replies he writes concerning God that the „very immensity of His being lies the cause or 
reason why He needs no cause in order to exist"'0. This immensity is equal to the positive 
infinity we read about in the Principles. In this work he clearly distinguishes the concept 
of infinite from the concept of indefinite, and „reserves to God alone the name of 
infinite". The reasons given by Descartes for this separation are that „in Him alone we 
observe no limitation (...) and we are quite certain that He can have none", while in the 
case of other things „we do not positively understand (...)but merely negatively admit that 
their limits, if they are exist, cannot be discovered by us"" 
By returning to the Meditationes, we can also see infinity playing a favoured role. In 
the Third Meditation, where Descartes makes a distinction between the ideas of the 
substances, he also uses infinity as a main category: „that idea by which I understand a 
supreme God, eternal, infinite omniscient, omnipotent and creator of all things which are 
outside of Himself, has certainly more objective reality in itself than those ideas by which 
finite substances are represented"12. Besides we should quote a letter in which Descartes 
defines infinite substance as „a substance which has has actually infinite and immense 
true and real perfections"13 Or we could refer to another letter in which he writes that 
„God is greater than the world, non in extension but in perfection'4 
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Here we should take note on a very important momentum: divine perfections are 
common in one aspect, namely that they are actually infinite. As Jean Luc Marion puts it 
„substance, when applied to God, becomes a simple qualification added to infinity, which 
alone is substantive and subject; thus it would be necessary to speak less of an infinite 
substance than of a substantial infinity.15 
But why is infinity the „first of divine names" (Marion)? Why can — at least for Descartes — 
the objective reality of this idea prove the formal reality of it? And why does Descartes 
underline the positivity of the infinity in the case of God? 
In my opinion, just because the idea of God — strictly speaking the idea of infinity — 
carries for him that surplus value, which has its origin in the genuine religious experience. 
(Descartes underlines the immediate givennes of this idea. He emphasizes that this idea 
proceeds neither from books or conversations16, nor from the statement „God exists"") 
In his meditatio he arrives at a point where he „meets" the idea of God. In the internal 
and immediate experience he perceives the most immense power, that he has ever 
perceived. As Levinas writes on „the idea of God, the cogitatum of a cogitatio which to begin 
with contains that cogitatio, signifies the non-contained par excellence (...) the 'objective reality' 
ofthe cogitatum of the cogitatum breaks up the formal reality of the cogitatio'"8 
In my opinion this breaking up of the thought „forces" Descartes to „respond", that 
is to say that he must conclude that God necessarily exists That's why he may write that „in some 
way I have in me the notion of the infinite earlier than the finite"19 
This moment is what I call the religious level of Descartes's thought. In my opinion 
the „way" just mentioned is a reference to the peculiar moment discussed. 
I'm aware of course that Descartes spoke a metaphysical — by the term of Levinas20 — 
substantialist language. But in spite of this he was who'with an unequalled rigor, has 
sketched out the extraordinary course of thought that proceeds on the breakup of the I 
think21 
Besides, I think so, that he tried to maintain the fact of the surplus value. In the 
Conversation with Burman we read the following: we understand the perfections and 
attributes of God, but we do not concieve of them — or, rather, in order to conceive them, 
conceive of them as indefinite"22. Descartes perceives very clear that the real infinity of 
God is beyond the philosophical discourse — but he also percevies that this does not mean 
that it is beyond our mental capacity, our understanding. 
I think this effort to put into words the surplus value to be the background the 
distinction between the concept of infinte and that of indefinite. And I think my reading 
to be a possible interpretation of the priority of infinity discussed above. 
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I have n o d o u b t that this interpretat ion has n o t solved the incoherences a n d tens ions 
that c a n b e b e discerned in the Cartes ian metaphysics a n d natural theology. T h e tens ions 
stay to b e tensions, t h e incoherences stay to be incoherences . B u t perhaps it c a n m a k e clear 
t h e core o f s o m e o f these problems. A n d last b u t n o t least I h o p e it has b e e n able to defend 
Descartes against t h e charges m e n t i o n e d : the mask is worn by a homo religiosus. 
Notes 
This paper is an enlarged version of my presentation based on an essay I wrote. 
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